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I.

That it is difficult to reconstruct an accurate picture of the composition and
functioning of the Epicurean psyche
congnized by scholars.

from the extant original

fragments has long been re

When we speak of "Epicurean" psychology, we must be careful to

distinguish between what theories Epicurus himself held, and what views were elaborated
by later members of the school, as it is probable that his later followers assimilated
either consciously or inadvertently teachings from other philosphical schools and tradi
tions into their own thinking.

Of course, there is the persistent claim which the later

Epicureans never tired of making, viz. that what they wrote was authentic doctrine or at
most an accurate extension of the master's philosophy.

Comparing this contention to that

of another tradition, we have the strong insistence of Plotinus that at no point does he
deviate from the teaching of Plato, a claim which we now know to be inaccurate.
agoreans likewise disclaimed any deviation from the thought of Pythagoras.
all,

The Ryth

It was,

after

characteristic of many ancient writers to pass off their ideas as the exegesis and

further development, if not the literal duplication, of the works of older masters.
In the light of such well-known claims, it is difficult to understand why so many
Epicurean scholars have accepted without question the pronouncements of later members of
the Epicurean tradition as being faithful to the thought of Epicurus.

Both of the scholars

whose interpretations are discussed in this paper make this assumption.

David Furley ac

cepts without demur the ideas of Lucretius as being "Epicurean," and Cyril Bailey states
the point

explicitly.

In discussing whether Lucretius'

conception of the psyche is faith-'

"It is highly improbable that Lucretius, who in all parts of

ful to Epicurus, Bailey says:

the poem is so scrupulous in following his master's lead in every detail,
itously amplified him"

(p.

388-89).

has here gratu'.""

Earlier in the same work he says that "it is fine tes

timony to the permanence of the Epicurean tradition that Lucretius,

even though his expli

cit references to the Canonice are but few and casual, yet observes it is practice as scrup
ulously as his Master" (p. 236).
It is difficult to understand how he knows this, espec
ially as he has just told us that the Canonice is lost.
The intrusion of non-Epicurean elements into the doctrines of later Epicureans is
However, it
indeed a vast topic and should be of concern to the historians of philosophy.
is not the purpose of this paper to trace the story of later addenda to the original philos

ophy of the founder of the Epicurean tradition, nor is it to identify the sequence of phases
by which doctrinal changes were made through the absorption of elements which seem to be
supportive of or akin to the views which made up the Epicurean theory of the soul.

Rather,

my purpose is to examine the interpretations advanced by these two scholars who seem con
vinced that there is no substantive difference between Epicurus' doctrine of the psyche and
that held by Lucretius, and test Lucretius'
I

think it can be shown that

1)

theory against the extant fragments of Epicurus.

there are certain features of Lucretius'

account of the

psyche which were neither parts of Epicurus' doctrine-nor necessary to account for the ori
ginal atomic theory of the soul; 2) Epicurus' theory is more complete than has previously
been believed to be the case; and 3) whatever the case with Epicurus an.d Lucretius, the
positions of the two scholars in question are no� clear or consistent.
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5.

cruµiti:wµai:a , occasional properties (Letter to Herodo

Compounds ,ftlso have symptomata
tus,

These properties are particular instances of variations in the symbebekota

70).

or constant accompanying properties.
color,

3

For instance,

this rather than that shade of

though both shades may be had at different t i�

that from acquired states,

Another example would be
free now but

like being rich now and poor at another time,

at war now but at peace later.
Another
example yet may be had with reference to diverse qualities:
hardness, softness, and

a slave later, asleep now but awake later,
so on.

6.

Epicurus argues against hypostatizing,
symbebekota

7.

(68).

i.e. making ontically ultimate,

The soul is corporeal and consists of atoms.
smooth,

spherical atoms,

But what kind of atoms compose the psyche?

Epicurus believed the psyche to be composed of

If Diogenes Laertius is to be trusted,
fine,

which have remarkable mobility.

a vessel for the soul and is needed for sensation.

8.

any of the

Here he is close to Aristotle.

The body,

he says,

Diogenes also says that body and soul come into existence simultaneously.
body does not possess all the capacities of the soul,
reason,

is

(D.L.10.66).

like memory,

Though the

intelligence,

and

it shares in the five senses and can share passively in the feelings of the

soul through sympatheia.

The soul is dispersed over the whole organism

(D.L.10.63;

10.64-end).

All of the above information (with the exception of the last two items) is from
the Letter to Herodotus.

Restricting ourselves to this information,

we draw about the Epicurean psyche?
common-sense perspective.

I think,

what conclusions can

helpful to look at the problem from a

Here before us we have a living human body.

What makes it ani

The two most obvious characteristics of a living body are that it is warm and breath

mate?
ing,

It is,

whereas a dead body is cold and does not breathe.

is after all a

So,

in the Letter to Herodotus,

which

sumrua:t:y of Epicurean philosophy, Epicurus says that the psyche is similar in

some respects to breath and heat.
probably a later addition.)

(It is significant that he does not mention air,

Why is the animate body breathing and warm?

spread throughout it a certain number of psyche-atoms.

which is

Because it has

The same body without these atoms

would be cold and unbreathing.
The psyche,
a human body),

heat and breath.
sation,

then,

seems to be some kind of compound,

memory,

On further reflection,

the ability to reason,

symbebekos of the psyche,
If heat,

etc.

These are also,

sensation,

memory,

shape,

(a)

this means that
and

(which,

(b)

they cannot exist
that they are

we are told,

have only

and weight).

What kind of compound is the psyche?
This is difficult to determine.

atoms are "sown" throughout the body,
On the other hand,

Is it an aggregate

On the one hand,

such as sensation,

such as reason and memory,

its own special properties.

However,

&�po�oµa

or a system

Epicurus says that the psyche

which suggests that there is a loose connection between

if Diogenes is correct,

to the whole animated body,
psyche alone,

either

and reason are indeed either symbebekota or

as common sense suggests,

i.e. they are not themselves kinds of atoms or compounds,

crucri:nµa ?
them.

like heat and br�ath,

(Although it would seem that sensation would be a

properties of compound entities and not of atoms themselves
size,

such as

at 64 Epicurus says that it is a symptoma of both the psyche and

breath,

svmptomata of the psyche,
alone,

(or it in conjunction with

we realize that an animate human being also has sen

symbebekota or symptomata of the psyche.
the body.)

as it

has certain properties which do not belong to atoms in isolation,

there are some functions which are common

but others which can be attributed to the

which would suggest that the psyche is a system with

this point is not too important,

words aggregate and system rather loosely.

For example,

as Epicurus uses the

in the passage on the composition

of the psyche he refers to the human body as a whole as both a system or organism and an
aggregate.
With this understanding of the constitution of the psyche,

we can now proceed to ex

amine and evaluate the views of two scholars who see no significant differences in the psychol
ogies of Epicurus and Lucretius.

Page 4
III.

follows:

David Furley translates the crucial passage from Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus as
The psyche is corporeal,

of fine texture,

similar to pnel!_ma with an admixture of heat,
the latter in another;

distributed over the whole frame,

most

being like the former is one way and

in addition there is the part greatly exceeding even these

in fineness of texture and by virtue of this being the more closely associated in

feeling with the rest of the frame

(p.196).

From this Furley concludes:
This carefully qualified summary mentions only three constituents -- something
like pneuma, heat, and something finer than these.
Later doxographers and Epicurus'
own disciple Lucretius, raise the number to four (p.196).
Now it seems that Furley's translation is not so very different from my own,

since

he says of psyche and its resemblance to heat and pneuma that it is "like the former in one

way and the l atter in another� i.e. bears some resemblance to both.

However,

in his commen

tary on the passage he draws the conclusion that there are three different constituents of

the psyche:

(1)

something like pneuma;

(2)

anQther. something like heat,

and

(3)

some

thing finer than these.
He then goes on to accept the testimony of Lucretius, supported by
Aetius and Plutarch, that the "Epicurean" psyche is composed
vapor
four constituents:
(something hot),

aura

't£.

and a fourth unnamed kind.

(pneuma) air,

Furley then proceeds to say:
may vary from one psyche to another;

"The proportions of at least three of the four kinds
we have the authority of Lucretius for this."

He then quotes a long passage from Lucretius

(3.294-397),

(p.197).

which suggests in rather poetic

terms that differences in temperament among human beings can be accounted for on the basis
of the varying proportions of the four elements in the psyche.

For example,

passionate men

have more of the "hot element" in their psyches.
There is more of the hot element in those whose bitter heart and wrathful mind
easily explodes in anger.

In this class above all is the forceful,

vio:Jent lion,

who bursts his breast with noise when he roars and can't contain the waves of
anger in his breast.

The chilly mind of deer is more full of breath and wafts

cool breezes through their bodies,
limbs.

which impart a trembling movement to their

The species of cattle lives more on air,

is never much charged to stir them smokily,
blind fog,

which is placid;

anger's firebrand

filling them with the darkness of

nor do they cower transfixed by the chilly arrows of fear;

betwixt and between the deer and the fierce lions.

they are
�
So it is with the race of men.

Furley comments on this passage from Lucretius as follows:
It will be seen at once that this is a perilous doctrine for an Epicurean to hold.
For it seems to entail that a man's character and his reactions to the world will
be determined at his birth by the proportions of pneuma,
If this is the case,

ean philosophy -- to teach men tranquillity.
to be;

if not,

not.

heat,

and air in his soul.

there is no hope of success in the ultimate aim of the Epicur
We are tranqul,

if it is our nature

(p.198)

I find the following difficulties in Furley's position.

1.

Furley speaks of "the proport:;i..ons of pneuma, heat,

and air in his soul."

He has

switched from saying on. p.196 that the constituents of the soul are something like
air,

something like heat,

fact air,

2.

heat,

etc.

etc.,

to saying that the constituents of the soul are in

In other words,

he has switched from resemblance to identity.

How can "heat" itself be a constituent of the soul?

I see no evidence that Epicurus

considered heat or breath to be either a compound or a kind of atom.
epiphenomenon,

3.

Heat is an

one of the symbebekota which are not really in the atom.

Diogenes Laertius does not suggest that there are four different constituents in the
psyche, and it seems to me that his testimony is usually more reliable than that of
either Aetius or Plutarch.

Plutarch is frequently unfair and inaccurate in discus-

Page 5

sing thinkers with whom he disagrees,

and he takes a decidedly polemical stance
)
001!£1:
Just the same, Furley, Bailey, and others'*"make special efforts to accomodate these
ancient testimonies, probably because they are closer to Lucretius' addenda.

against Epicurus

4.

(

KwA.wT� 6E: yEA.oi:ov

•

•

•

•

He infers from the Lucretius passage that according to "Epicurean" psychology there

are different proportions of the four kinds in different people

mean "Lucretian" (as it should,

•

.

Does "Epicurean"

since the theory is based solely on a passage from

In a later summary of "Epi

Lucretius),

or is it also intended to include Epicurus?

Epicurean:

"Each person is born with a psyche of a particular character,

curean" psychology it becomes evident that he means to include this as genuinely

determined

by the proportions of atoms of the four different kinds which constitute a psyche"
(p.233).

5.

One of the problems with which Furley is concerned throughout the second part of his

book,

"Aristotle and Epicurus on Voluntary Action",

in his commentary on the passage from Lucretius,

is the difficulty which he states

viz. how to hold a person responsible

for his character if this is determined at birth by "the proportions of pneuma,

and air in his soul."

After a discussion of this problem,

he concludes that:

heat

"The

character of the person is to some extent still determined by the initial constitu
tion of his psyche,

the same.

because the proportions of atoms of different types in it remain

But to a much greater extent his character is adaptable,

because the

motions of the atoms are not determined and can be changed by learning"

(234).

It

seems to me that much of the difficulty Furley has in attempting to reconcile volun
tary action and the formation of character with the pre-determination caused by the

proportions of pneuma,

at least,

heat and air in the soul is simply eliminated,

if this theory is seen to be Lucretian and not Epicurean.

for Epicurus

The central point

which Furley attempts to establish in his second study is that Epicurus'
voluntary action was developed in response to Aristotle.
Epicurus' theory,

6.

Finally,

of atoms,

he consistently brings in Lucretius.

Furley sometimes says that the psyche is composed of four different kinds

as when he says of the psyche that "the proportions of atoms of different

types in it remain the same'' (p.234).

to suggest,

However,

he sometimes says,

or at least seems

that the constituents of the psyche are not different kinds of atoms,

the compounds pneuma,

heat,

and air.

(which seems to mean something hot)"

If one of the constituents of the psyche is "something hot",

ent cannot be a kind of atom,

as atoms have only size,

compound can have the characteristic of being hot.

shape,

this constitu

and weight.

Only a

He also says that to a certain

heat and

extent one's character is determined at birth "by the proportions of pneuma,

air in his soul"

(p.198).

but

He says that according to Lucretius and Epicur

us one of the constituents of the psyche is "vapor
(p.196).

theory of

But in his formulation of

This suggests a kind of complex entity,

Whatever position Furley means to take on this issue,

not a kind of atom.

it seems to me that Lucretius

considered the ultimate constituents of the psyche to be more complex entities than
atoms.

Let us look briefly at the evidence.

Lucretius' contention that the soul is composed of particles of heat,

a fourth unnamed constituent,

could mean one of two things,

Epicurus and the other of which is incompatible with Epicurus' philosophy.
mean that there are four kinds of atoms in the psyche,
combined in sufficient numbers,

would produce heat,

by the Letter to Herodotus passage,

breath,

Lucretius could

and that these are atoms which,

breath,

air and

one of which is not suggested by
if

This is not suggested

and air.

which says that the soul is like a blend of heat and

breath and that it in some way resembles heat and it in some way resembles breath.

I do not

think that Epicurus regarded heat and breath as either kinds of atoms or as compound entities

of any kind,
all.

but as properties of compounds,

On the other hand,

and he does not mention "air" in his summary at

Lucretius could mean that the air,

the psyche are entities more complex than atoms,
not possessed by atoms,

such as being hot.

breath,

and heat which go into

and already possess some properties which are

This clearly seems to be implied in his position
If this is his position,

that passionate people have more of the hot element in their psyches.

it revises substantially Epicurus' theory of ultimate atoms,

making the soul a compo.11,1d composed

Page 6

of other compounds.

Lucretius consistently seems to ascribe to the components of the soul

the properties of compounds.
breath,

In discussing the composition of the psyche,

mingled with heat,

forsakes the bodies of dying men;

he says that

and this heat draws

the air along with it, for there can be no heat without air intermixed,

being in its nature rare,

must have some seeds of air united with it

He concludes from this that the components of the soul� heat,

which,

if combined in sufficient quantities,

breath,

would produce these),

and heat

(iii.234-237).

and air

5

(not atoms

and goes on to name a

fourth even finer constituent which accounts for sensation and thought.

The word which Lucretius uses most frequently to refer to the constituents of the

psyche is "seeds"

(semina).

Although he sometimes refers to atoms as semina,

where he argues that the atoms themselves are colorless,
this word something more complex than an atom.

as at the end of Book IV
217),

"seeds of heat"

(4.1036-1277).

He often uses it to refer to living organisms,

He also referes to "seeds of fire"

(6.271,

as in 2.730-841

he usually seems to have in mind by

275, 883), and "seeds of water" (6.497,
meaning by such phrases a compound of some sort rather than an atom.

(6.160,

517, 520),

200, 213,

apparently

Perhaps one could say that the original or ultimate constituents of the psyche are

atoms of four kinds.

These combine to produce compounds which are hot,

pounds are in turn parts of the psyche.

and these com

The psyche is still a compound

stages in the formation of the psyche helps the situation.
composed of other compounds;

etc.,

I cannot see that allowing for such intermediate

the problem has simply been removed by one or more stages.

The only way in which it might be acceptable to say that the psyche is composed of

four kinds of atoms would be to say that when these atoms hook together to form a psyche,

they produce a different kind of compound than they would have produced had they made air,

heat,

and breath.

psyche as a

fr. 290 Us,

xpaµa

Kerferd makes a suggestion similar to this when he interprets Epicurus'

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias De Mixtione 214.28-215.8 Bruns=

xpaot.�

Epicurus supposed "that in

the separate substances were fist broken up

into their constituent atoms which were then re-combined.

So it was not so much a combina

tion of two or more substances as a new combination of substance-forming atoms."

b Kerferd

then interprets Lucretius' concept of the psyche to be "not a mixture of four

substances by juxtaposition,

but a true Epicurean

the reference to semina in III. 127-8.

is,

after all,

an interpretation,

xpaµa

•

" 1

This,

he believes,

explains

I am not sure that we can accept this solution.

based on nothing in either Epicurus or Lucretius.

tius does not suggest that the soul is a

xpaµa

(or any Latin equivalent),

It

Lucre-

and he clearly

seems to attribute to the constituents of the psyche the properties of different kinds of

compounds.

Nowhere does he suggest that the compounds composing the psyche are broken down

and re-combined as something different.

IV.
After stating Lucretius'

"Two

position on the composition of the psyche,

questions suggest themselves:

by Lucretius on his own authority,

Cyril Bailey says:

Ls this a spontaneous addition to Epicurus' theory.made
and whether this is so or not, what is the significance of

the addition?" p.388).
In response to the first question, he innnediately concludes that he
does not think Lucretius has "gratuitously amplified" his master.
Like Furley, he appeals

to Aetius and Plutarch for additional support for the contention that Epucurus held the soul
an element like heat, one like air, one like breath or

to be a compound of four constituents,

wind,

(Connnentary on Lucretius' De �m Natura, vol. II. p.1026;
In his connnentary on the Letter to Herodotus Bailey is careful to

and a fourth nameless element

also Epicurus,

p.226).

distinguish between Lucretius and Epicurus:

psychi} is air and wind and heat:

heat"

(p.388,

difference

390;

also Epicurus p.227).

(See p.387).

Bailey believes that Epicurus'

identification of the soul with fire.
ception that the soul

"Lucretius says straightforwardly that it �he
breath and

Epicurus more guardedly that it is 'most like'
However,

he does not consistently maintain t_his

view of the psyche is a refinement of Democritus'
"Democritus inherited from Leucippus the general con

(psyche) or vital principle was corporeal,

that it was of the nature
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of fire and was, like fire, composed of spherical atoms, for they were the most mobile. These
ideas Democritus retained unmodified." (p.156). But it is not at all clear that Democritus
identified the soul with fire; what he says, or seems to suggest, is that the soul, like fire,
is composed of spherical particles. In support of Democritus' identification of soul with
fire, Bailey quotes Diogenes Laertieus ix.44 on Democritus: "The sun and moon are composed
of smooth and spehrical particles, and likewise the soul." Commenting on this, Bailey says:
"The soul that is, is fiery in its nature, therefore it must be composed of the same kind of
particles as the fiery heavenly bodies: the presence of the spherical particles give to both
therir characteristics." (p.156). This, although correct, does not identify soul with fire,
but says merely that they are both composed of similar spherical atoms.
Bailey also quotes Aristotle's de Anima A.2.405a5, in .support of his claim that Demo
critus identified the soul with fire: "Some have thought the soul is fire: for fire too has
finest parts and is the most bodiless acrwµcnov
of all the elements and more than anything
else is moved and moves other things." I have difficuluty understanding how Bailey can ex
tract from the de Anima passage the inference that Aristotle connects Democritus with those
who thought that the soul is fire, as the text doesn't permit this inference. in fact, what
Aristotle does in the sentence immediately following A.2.405a5 is to contrast Democritus with
those who associated soul with fire, although both he and those who identified the soul with
fire addressed themselves to the same problem, viz. how "the soul moves and is a primary cause
of movement in other things." Aristotle says that "Democritus has explained with greater
precision why each of these two things is so, for he identifies the soul with the mind."
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Hence de Anima A.2.405a5 offers no support to the inference that Aristotle classified Democri
tur among those who taught that the soul is fire.
W. K. C. Guthrie, in discussing whether or not Democritus identified the soul with
fire, quotes a much stronger passage from Aristotle: "This Lthe theory that soul is self
moving and the origin of movement in other thingi) is what led Democritus to say that soul
is a sort of fire or hot substance; his 'forms' or atoms are infinite in number; those which
are spherical he calls fire and soul." (de Anima 404al-2.)
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Even this passage does not suggest a sequence in composition from spherical atoms to fire
and from fiery body to soul. All it establishes is that fire and soul resemble each other,
"Did Demo
and are both composed of spherical atoms. Guthrie goes on to raise the question:
critus actually identify soul with fire?" (p.43lff.) He believes that "the question is not
altogether simple." Guthrie does think that Aristotle inferred the identity of soul and fire,
but as I have indicated I am not sure that Aristotle did so unqualifiedly. Guthrie, anyway,
does not give a concrete answer to this question. He merely says that "all previous and con
temporary thought would influence Democritus towards associating life with heat, and all au
thorities agree that he did so." (p.432). This latter statement is correct and puts the Demo
critean view in the right perspective.
To return to Bailey:
he states that Epicurus preserves this idea (i.e. Democritus'
view that the soul is fire), "but it is not by itself sufficiently subtle for him" (p.387),
so he added three other elements. I cannot see thatBailey is on good grounds for attributing
to Epicurus a further refinement of Democritus' view, especially since it cannot be concus
ively established that Democritus actually identified the soul with fire. But to prove his
most resemb
point, Bailey quotes Epicurues' definition of soul: "a body of fine particles
ling breath with a certain admixture of heat and in some parts like to one of these and in
some to the other" (387-388).
·

•

•

•

The most perplexing statement comes directly after the quotation: "Heat is thus re
tained as a constituent element, but to it is now added the element of breath or wind (pneuma)�
The difficulty lies with the introduction of the expression "constituent element." For we do
not know how "heat" is an element, or "breath" for that matter. To ascribe to them some tech
nical meaning in Epicurus' ontology would not be too difficult, but to.call them "constituent
elements" of psyche is to revise substantially the theory of ultimate atoms. Heat and breath
are properties of compounds, and air is as much composite as soul. Now, to take properties
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of fire or soul compounds such as heat and make these properties constituent elements of
soul-compounds, is to derive somehow soul compounds not solely from spherical atoms but from
spherical atoms, other compounds such 1as air, and properties emerging with compounds, such as
Soul is then a compound composed of other compounds and properties arising from com

heat.

What is, then, a case of resemblance is turned into one of derivation.
pounds.
think there is any support for this in Epicurus.

I do not

Bailey says repeatedly that the soul is actually composed of heat, breath, and air
(p.388,390;

also Epicurus,p.227).

That he maintained this position is obvious, for example,

Following Giussani, Bailey says
in his discussion of the difference between air and breath.
that according to Epicurus heat, wind, and air are three different substances, each with a
different temperatu�e.

Heat is hot, wind or breath is cold, and air has a temperature some

where between that of the other two.

Bailey goes on to say that Epicurus accounts for differ

ent levels of heat and cold in the psyche by having it composed of three constituent elements,
each with a different temperature:

"The three elements in the soul then represent, as Gius

sani thinks, three distinct temperatures, 'air,' the normal temperature of the atmosphere,
'heat' 'a temperature above normal, and 'wind' below normal"
that Bailey believes the constituents

of

(p.389).

It is clear

from this

the soul to be themselves compounds, as he ascribes

to them heat, coldness, and a temperature between the other two.
stances" to apply to the constituents of the psyche.

He also uses the word "sub

Although he does not tell us exactly

how he uses this word, a "substance" is obviously something more complex than an atom.
His position on the composition of the psyche is stated very explicitly when Bailey
writes:

"The soul is composed of the four elements:

atoms be?"

(p.395).

of what character will its component

This makes it clear that when he uses such terms as "substance" and

"element" to apply to the constituents of the psyche, he is not using them as synonyms for
What precisely does he mean by referring to the constituents of the psyche as "ele
If the term "element" (stoicheion) is employed in any technical sense, it should not
be used to refer to heat, air, etc.S
If "element" means some kind of ultimate constituent,
"atom".

ments"?

then the "elements' for Epicurus are atoms.
It seems to me that too much has been made of
this theory of "constituent elements of the soul," and much confusion results form switching
back and forth from "constituent elements" to "component atoms" and other similar expressions.

v.
I do not wish to maintain that the composition of the Epicurean psyche is a simple
problem.

What kind of compound entity the soul is, and all of the problems resulting from its
However, I

union with the rest of the human organism, make the question a complex one indeed.

Both
do not think that the .scholars under consideration have really clarified the issue.
Furley and Bailey refer indiscriminately to the component parts of the psyche as "constituents';
Perhaps
"elements," and "atoms."
Bailey also uses the words "particles" and "substances."
these words could all be used in a non-technical sense to mean loosely "component," or as syn
However, this is clearly not the case for Bailey, who as we have seen

onymous with "atom."

distinguishes the "elements" of the psyche from its "atoms."

I cannot make any sense of this

in an Epicurean context.
Both Bailey and Furley say alternately that:
Epicurus, p.

1.

Soul is like pneuma, etc. (Furley, p.196; Bailey, 388, 390;

2�

Soul has as its ultimate components air-atoms, pneuma-atoms, etc.

227).

(Furley, p.

196,234;

Bailey, p. 395, 581).
3.

the
Soul has as its ultimate components heat-compound, air-compound, etc. , which makes
soul a compound composed of other compounds and substantially revises the Epicurean
theory of ultimate atoms.

(Furley, p.

197; Bailey, p. 388).

Are we to think of it as four sepa rate
Neither explains what kind of entity the psyche is.
Are these four substances som e
psyche?
a
substances, which are somehow collectively called
how united to produce a single entity,

a psyche?

If so, how?

In conclusion, I have tried in this paper to establish the following differences
between the Epicurean and Lucretian psyches:
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